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Abstract 
 
We analyze in a simple model the consequences of efficiency heterogeneity 
at the firm level for the sorting of workers with different skills into firms with 
different characteristics. We show that more efficient firms tend to produce 
higher quality output in equilibrium, which then translates into higher relative 
demand of education and unmeasured skills. The model provides an 
integrated explanation within a competitive framework for the observed 
correlations between several establishment characteristics (size, employees’ 
average education, capital/labor ratio, and remoteness of selling markets) and 
average wages. We test the implications of the model using Spanish 
employer-employee matched data that allow to simultaneously control for 
establishment and worker characteristics. We find that average education in 
the establishment is increasing in the remoteness of its main market. 
Establishment’s size, remoteness of main market, and co-workers’ average 
education have significant, robust and quantitatively important positive joint 
effects on wages. The national-market orientation effects (with respect to 
local-market orientation) on labor composition and wages are at least as 
important as the international-market effects (with respect to national-market 
orientation). All wage premia are non-decreasing on worker education and 
most of them are strictly increasing, suggesting that unmeasured skills are 
relatively more important for high-education workers. 
Keywords: Quality Competition, Exporting Firms, Unobservable Skills, 
Wages. (JEL: J24, J31, I20). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is by now a sizeable empirical literature pointing out that some characteristics of firms 
are associated with larger average wages. In particular, it has been claimed that larger 
establishments, exporters, firms with high capital/labor ratio, and firms with high average 
education employees pay higher wages.1 This line of research is opening the door to a large 
series of possible determinants of workers’ pay, but it is also suggesting that largely 
heterogeneous workers are matched with heterogeneous establishments following some 
systematic patterns that are connected to the cited observable establishment characteristics. 
Yet, we are still far away from being confident that we fully understand the mechanisms for 
these establishment-wage and sorting effects, and the empirical evidence that has been offered 
so far is still weak in several respects.2 In this paper we try to contribute to the literature on 
both the theoretical and the empirical grounds. First, we build a simple model emphasizing 
firm-efficiency heterogeneity and quality competition, which can explain all the cited 
correlations between employers’ characteristics and wages within a unifying framework. 
Second, we test the model’s implications on establishments’ labor composition and wage 
effects, taking care of individuals’ observable characteristics and extending the evidence in 
several directions. 
 
Most explanations offered for the establishment-characteristics wage effects are informal 
and apply only to the firm size effect. They may be classified according to whether or not they 
imply deviations from competitive labor markets. It has been argued that efficiency wages, 
internal labor markets, and monopoly rents that are shared with employees are relatively more 
important in large firms. On the other hand, competitive arguments tend to point out that large 
firms have more profitable conditions to use new and capital intensive technologies, which 
require more skilled labor that is paid according to its larger productivity. An additional 
specific argument put forward for the employees’ average education effect is the high 
complementarity between skilled workers (Kremer (1993) and Kremer and Maskin (1996)). In 
                                                 
1 Abowd and Kramarz (1999) is a general survey on studies linking firm and worker data. The existence of a 
positive firm-size wage premium is probably the most extensively documented firm characteristic effect, and has 
been analyzed among others by Idson and Oi (1999) and Troske (1999). Oi and Idson (1999), and Lallemand, 
Plasman, and Rycx (2005) provide reviews of the theoretical arguments and the empirical results. The hypothesis 
that exporter firms pay larger wages has also received extensive treatment by a recent literature starting with 
Bernard and Jensen (1995), which is surveyed in Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2006). The effect of average co-
workers’ education on individual wages is analyzed in Bayard and Troske (1999), Troske (1999), and in Battu, 
Belfield and Sloane (2003). For the relationship between the capital/labor ratio and average wages in the 
establishment see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis(1999), Troske (1999), and Arai (2003). 
2 Note that the starting point of the large literature on the complexities and the consequences of the matching 
process between workers and firms is a large heterogeneity among both workers and firms. However, we know 
very little about the possible patterns of who matches with whom in terms of broad characteristics. 
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this paper we take a competitive approach and built a model that analyzes the consequences of 
efficiency heterogeneity at the firm level for the sorting of workers with different skills into 
firms with different characteristics. We assume that firms compete in prices as well as in 
quality. Workers differ by measured and unmeasured characteristics (education and other 
skills, respectively). In equilibrium, workers are paid their marginal productivities, and firms’ 
price and quality choices jointly determine establishments’ observable characteristics and the 
optimal composition of its labor force. 
 
The general implication of the model is that under very reasonable assumptions quality 
competition implies that more skilled and educated workers are sorted into more efficient 
firms. The reason is that in equilibrium more efficient firms choose to produce higher quality 
goods. In equilibrium, more efficient firms are also larger and sell in more distant markets. As 
a result, the model predicts that we should observe: (1) average education of employees tends 
to be higher in larger firms and firms selling in more distant markets; (2) firms with higher 
average education, larger size or selling in more distant markets pay higher average wages to 
workers, even after controlling for workers’ education. Thus, the model provides an integrated 
explanation for the observed correlations between the cited establishment characteristics and 
wages. The model also points at the relevant parameters that determine the relationship 
between the capital/labor ratio and average wages (conditional on education), and the pattern 
followed by establishment-characteristics premia with respect to worker education. Our model 
may be related to the recent literature that emphasizes the importance of taking into account 
efficiency heterogeneity at the plant level to explain several important facts related to 
international trade and the dynamics of aggregate productivity (Metrick (2003), and Bernard et 
al. (2003)). As in these papers, the existence of trade costs induces only the most productive 
firms to self-select into exporters. This paper extends the implications of efficiency 
heterogeneity on firms’ labor composition and wages. 
 
In the second part of the paper, we test the implications of the model using Spanish data 
from the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Wage Structure Survey) of 2002. This survey 
contains matched data for more than 150,000 workers and 15,000 establishments, and includes 
most relevant characteristics of individuals (such as education, genre, age, years in the current 
firm, type of contract, etc.) and establishments (location, industry, size, market orientation, 
etc.). We explain the details on the data and the sample in Section 3. 
 
In Section 4 we use these data to analyze the model’s implications on the relationship 
between establishment’s characteristics (in particular, establishment’s main market –or market 
orientation- and size) and the educational composition of its labor force. Bernard and Jensen 
(1997) provide evidence that the ratio of non-production to production workers is larger in 
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exporting firms. Similarly, Maurin, Thesmar, and Thoenig (2002) argue that the tasks related 
to product development, marketing, and customizing have a potentially very different content 
depending on whether they are performed for the domestic or a foreign market, so that the 
very act of exporting requires a skill upgrading of these activities. Using data on the 
occupational structure, they show that the fraction of high-skill jobs increases with the share of 
exported output, particularly in the development/marketing areas. Our results also show that 
average education in establishments whose main market is the European Union is larger than 
in establishments oriented to the domestic market. Moreover, the difference is considerably 
larger when comparing establishments whose main market is the Rest of the World (non-EU 
countries) with domestic-market oriented establishments. However, there is also a substantial 
difference in average education between local-market establishments and national-market 
establishments, which has not been uncovered so far. This difference is larger than the 
difference between national-market and European-market establishments, and is at least as 
important as the difference between national-market and Rest of the World-market 
establishments. Similar results are obtained using the fraction of college graduates in the 
establishment instead of the mean of employees’ schooling years. Thus, it appears to be more 
of a sequence of echelons in the effect of market orientation (from the local to the national 
market, and then to the European and eventually to the World market) than a binary exporting 
versus non-exporting effect. This is consistent with our theoretical model, where decisions on 
which markets to serve and how much human capital to hire depend on establishment 
efficiency.3 Indeed, the difference in efficiency needed for a firm to move on from the local 
market to the national market may be higher than the difference needed to go on to export. 
Furthermore, our empirical analysis shows that, once we control for two-digit industries, 
larger size does not necessarily imply a higher relative demand for high-education workers. 
Notwithstanding, size do is positively related to high average education conditional on the 
establishment having a non-local market orientation. 
 
In Section 5 we test the model’s implications on wages. The common shortcoming to 
almost all studies on the exporting status premium is that they use average data at the plant or 
firm level and therefore cannot control for individual worker characteristics. Since, as we 
already noted, employees’ average education is positively correlated with the exporting status, 
the results are likely to be biased. The exception is Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2006) who 
use linked employer-employee data from Germany. However, these authors rely on imputed 
data for white-collar workers and obtain results that are in contradiction with other evidence 
and with ours. Furthermore, analyses of the firm-size wage premium typically fail to control 
for market orientation (or for the less demanding exporting status variable) with which firm 
                                                 
3 Which is also consistent with Bernard and Jensen (1999) analysis that efficiency is the cause of the exporting 
status. 
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size is highly correlated. Our data set will allow us to simultaneously controlling for all the 
usual worker characteristics and the cited establishment characteristics. 
 
We obtain that all the variables suggested by the theoretical model have the expected 
signs, are jointly statistically significant, and have an important quantitative impact. According 
to our preferred estimation, workers in establishments whose main market is the whole 
country obtain average wages 10.5-percent higher than wages in local-market establishments. 
This wage premium rises to 18.1-percent and to 20.3-percent when the main market is either 
the EU or the rest of the world (non-EU countries), respectively. Thus, as with the analysis on 
establishments’ labor composition, the wage premium for national-market establishments 
(with respect to local establishments) is at least as important as the premium for international-
market establishments (with respect to national ones), which again has been the only one 
analyzed by the literature. Including all of our establishment characteristics reduces the 
coefficient on worker’s years of schooling by more than one third, which is consistent with the 
common presumption that education coefficients partially capture the effect of unmeasured 
skills. Working in establishments with the good characteristics (those that our model 
associates with high skills sorting) brings about a wage premium that is almost comparable to 
the education premium. For example, according to our preferred model estimates, working in a 
medium size establishment whose main market is the national market brings about the same 
wage premium (23.9-percent) over the reference group (small local establishments) than 5.2 
additional years of schooling. The results are robust to changing the way in which individuals’ 
education as well as establishments’ average education are measured in the model, and to the 
inclusion of proxies controlling for other possible effects that have been suggested by the 
literature. More specifically, we include proxies for the potential bargaining power of workers 
and unions, and for the effect of internal labor markets in large establishments. 
 
In the last subsection of Section 5 we address the question of whether establishment-
characteristics wage premia show any specific pattern with respect to worker education. This 
is an important question not only because it helps understanding the wage structure, but also 
because it provides indications about whether unmeasured skills are more important (i.e., more 
productive and valuable) for high-education or for low-education workers. We obtain that all 
the establishment characteristics we are considering have positive and significant wage effects 
on all education groups, and that the effects are non-decreasing in education in all cases and 
strictly increasing in most cases.4 For example, the coefficients on co-workers’ average 
                                                 
4 These results are in contrast with the very short literature that has explored the issue; e.g., Battu, Belfield and 
Sloane (2003), Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx (2005), and Shank, Schnabel and Wagner (2006). Nonetheless, 
except in the first reference, the comparison being carried out is not between education groups but between blue-
collard and white-collard workers. 
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education and on establishment’s market orientation obtained for the sub-sample of college 
graduates double and in some cases triple the coefficients obtained for the sub-sample of 
workers not having completed secondary studies. This brings about very large establishment 
wage premia for college graduates. As a final example, consider the case of a college-degree 
worker employed in a medium-size establishment exporting most of its production to the 
European Union and with co-workers’ average education in the 75th percentile of the 
corresponding distribution. This worker obtains an average wage 86.4-percent higher than an 
individual with the same education and working in a small local-market establishment situated 
in the 25th percentile of the distribution on establishments’ average-education. The same 
comparison of establishment characteristics but for workers without completed secondary 
studies brings about a premium of 29.8-percent. Thus, unmeasured skills seem to be much 
more valuable for high-education workers. In Section 6 of the paper we summarize and 
conclude. 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
In this Section we build a partial equilibrium model where efficiency-heterogeneous firms 
compete in prices and quality, and employ workers with heterogeneous measured and 
unmeasured characteristics. The aim of the model is to analyze the relationships between 
firm’s observable equilibrium characteristics and, first, establishments’ labor composition, and 
second, average wages paid by the firm to workers with the same observable characteristics. 
 
Demand and Technology 
 
Firms are indexed by j and may sell their output in different markets, which are indexed by h. 
Consumers are identical in all markets but markets may differ in size. Mh is the size of market 
h (Mh may be thought of as the number of consumers in that market). Demand for firm j in 
market h, , depends on firm j’s price  and quality in that market ≥1, and on market 
size according to the following inverse demand function: 
h
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5 The assumption that  is just a normalization on quality. We take q=1 to be the minimum quality 
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Output is obtained by using capital and labor, which may be educated or non-educated, 
and skilled or unskilled. Skill is the characteristic representing workers’ productive capacities 
that are observable by firms but are unmeasured by conventional statistics (so that we cannot 
control for them in the empirical analysis). Education is observable by firms and measured by 
statistics. Hence possible combinations sum up to four types of workers:  is the number of 
educated and skilled workers employed by firm j,  are the non-educated and skilled 
workers,  are the educated and unskilled workers, and  are the non-educated and 
unskilled workers. We also use the following notation: 
, , . Firm j has the following production function: 
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where  is the firm-specific efficiency parameter. For any choice of output quality , this is 
a conventional CES production function. Increasing output quality comes at the cost of lower 
output per worker. Moreover, producing high quality goods out of unskilled and uneducated 
labor may be difficult or even impossible. Unskilled non-educated work becomes a 
decreasingly good substitute for skills and education when it comes at producing higher 
quality. We formalize this idea by assuming that productivity of unskilled and uneducated 
labor decreases faster than that of skilled and educated labor, as quality increases:
jA jq
6
                                                                                                                                                         
2'/'')/( <− σσhhj Mylevel). The condition  on the curvature of the (per capita) inverse demand functionσ is the 
standard assumption that guarantees the second order conditions of profit maximization. 
6 In many cases, devoting more time per unit of output is not sufficient to produce higher quality output. It is also 
indispensable to use above-average skills (besides having the appropriate education). For example, it is unlikely 
that a low skilled architect is able to design innovative solutions to outstanding architectural problems whatever 
the time provided for the project; similarly, it is unlikely that the service provided in a top restaurant by a highly 
skilled waiter can be matched by low skilled waiters just by increasing their number. In such cases, unskilled 
workers’ marginal productivity goes to zero as the quality being targeted increases. As a result, it has been 
assumed in the literature that only workers with certain minimum human capital would be able to produce goods 
of a given quality (e.g., Stokey, 1991). In our model we only need the weaker assumption that productivity 
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Production and Transportation Costs 
 
Interest rate (plus physical-capital depreciation rate) and wages are taken by firms as given, 
and are denoted by r, , , , and .NUw NSw EUw ESw 7 We assume ,iUiS ww > NEi ,= . Minimizing 
the cost function  for a given pair (y
i
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Computing the cost function for optimal input choices is also standard: 
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So far, the costs we have considered involve only production costs. Nevertheless, selling in 
different markets involves market-specific transportation, logistics, and other non-production 
costs. We assume that selling in market h implies an additional cost τh per unit of output. In 
general, we may expect this cost to be increasing in the remoteness of market h, though τh is 
likely to be far from linear in distance.8 Without loss of generality we may label markets such 
τh+1 > τh. Hence, firm j’s cost of producing and selling  units of quality  in market h is:  hjy
h
jq
                                                                                                                                                         
decreases faster for unskilled and non-educated labor than for skilled and educated one, when quality is 
increased.  
7 Assuming that different firms have different access to financial markets (i.e., they face different interest rates rj) 
would have similar implications than those stemming from differences in the efficiency parameter Aj.  
8 The rise in costs per unit of output when selling in more distant markets may involve important discontinuities. 
Exporting may imply a discrete jump in costs due to additional administrative procedures, tariffs, use of foreign 
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Equilibrium 
 
For every market, profit maximization subject to the demand function (1) implies the 
following FOC that determine the optimal values  and : *hjy
*h
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Assuming jA/)1(')1(' φδ > , equation (6) has a solution , which is unique and 
independent of the market. Since 
1* >jq
0)('' ≤qδ  and 0)('' >qφ , equation (6) implies that higher 
efficiency firms choose higher quality in equilibrium: 
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A necessary and sufficient condition for firms to be active in a market ( ) is 0* >hjy
( ) ( ) hjjj qAq τφσδ −−+ )(/10)( ** >0.9 In such a case, equation (7) holds, which implies that more 
efficient firms will be larger (in terms of output) in every market where they are active:10
 
(9)  ( ) ( ) .0'/''/2 1' *2
*
>+−= σσ
φ
σ hhjj
h
j
h
j
MyA
M
dA
dy
 
                                                                                                                                                         
languages, etc. Similarly (though often overlooked), the cost rise when a previously local firm goes on to sell to 
the national market may also be significant. This move typically involves a new logistic echelon between 
production and retailing, implying qualitatively new needs in terms of information, transportation, inventory, 
warehousing, material handling, and packaging. In the empirical part of this paper we will distinguish between 
firms selling most of their output either in the local, the domestic, the European Union or the rest of the world 
(non-EU) markets. 
9 Below we elaborate more on the relationship between efficiency and the decision to be active in different 
markets. 
10 Recall that our assumptions on σ(.) ensuring that the second order conditions of profit maximization are 
satisfied, just imply that is positive. '/'')/(2 σσhhj My+
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Note that this result is obtained in spite of more efficient firms be producing higher quality 
output. Yet, producing higher quality does not imply selling at higher prices. This can be 
observed in the following expression whose sign is undefined: 
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For example, if inverse demand is inelastic to quality (small 'δ ) and rather convex (high ''σ ), 
higher efficiency firms will tend to sell higher-quality goods at lower prices than firms 
producing lower-quality goods (this may happen since consumers are willing to pay for 
diversity). Moreover, it may occur that a given firm sets a higher price than a lower-efficiency 
firm in one market, and a lower price in a different market.11 This casts some doubts on the 
use of prices as proxies for quality in empirical studies. 
 
Labor Sorting and Average Wages  
 
From the FOC in (3) and assuming interior equilibria ( ; i=N,E; h=U,S), we obtain 
that both education-group ratios of skilled workers will be larger in firms producing higher 
quality: 
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11 Consider two firms with almost the same efficiency level, so that the first term, , is almost 
the same for both firms. And a demand function such that  tends to zero as per capita 
demand  decreases, and tends to infinity as  increases. In nearby markets, per capita sales 
 will be large and therefore  will tend to be positive. Whereas for the most distant markets 
where both firms sell, per capita sales will be close to zero and   will be negative. 
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From this last expression and assuming ,Nj
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j llll // ≥ 12 we obtain that the ratio of educated 
workers  is also larger in firms producing higher quality: j
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Now, since more efficient firms produce higher quality, equations (11) and (12) imply that 
more efficient firms use a larger proportion of skilled workers at each education group, and a 
larger proportion of high-education workers with respect to their total employment: 
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Since >1,iUiS ww / NEi ,= , and using (13) we obtain that more efficient firms pay higher 
average wages at every education level: 
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12 It is seems unanimously agreed that unmeasured skills and education are positively correlated since skills can 
be very useful in achieving a high level of formal education. Hence the fraction of skilled workers that are 
educated should be larger than the fraction on unskilled that are educated. 
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Note that the positive relationship between efficiency and average wages depends crucially on 
the endogenous positive relationship between efficiency and quality. Should we assume that 
output quality is exogenous and the same for all firms, firms would choose the same labor 
composition no matter their efficiency. 
 
Firm Characteristics and Average Wages 
 
As noticed above, in equilibrium, not all firms are active in all markets since profits would 
otherwise be negative. Let 0>hA  denote the minimum efficiency level for a firm to be active 
in market h. This threshold is given by the value of the efficiency parameter implying zero 
profits per unit of output at the maximum possible price (i.e., for ), given optimal 
quality decisions 
0=hjy
)(* h
h
j Aq  and transport cost to market h: 
 
  ( ) .))(()/1(0))(( ** hhhjhhhj AqAAq τφσδ +=−  
 
Thus if firm j’ sells in market h’ but firm j’’ does not, it must be the case that '''' jhj AAA ≥> . 
The efficiency threshold hA  for being active in market h is increasing in the cost of bringing 
the product to that market:  
 
(16) .0))((/)(/ *2 >=∂∂ hhjhhh AqAA φτ  
 
As a result, the remoteness of the markets where a firm sells in is informative about its higher 
efficiency. This also has implications on firm size. We already noted that more efficient firms 
have larger sales in every market. Now, since more efficient firms also sell in a larger number 
of markets, their total size in terms of output, ∑ <∈= }:{ jh AAhh hjj yy , is larger. 
 
As noted in the Introduction, there is also some empirical evidence on a positive 
relationship between the capital/labor ratio and average wages. In our model, this relationship 
depends on the technological assumptions about the relationship between quality and physical 
capital. A sufficient condition for quality and the capital/labor ratio to be positively related 
is (to see this, just follow the argument used to obtain (11) and (12)). Under this 
condition, the capital/labor ratio would be positively associated with high average wages for 
every education level. We will not pursue this issue in the empirical part of the paper, 
however, since our data set does not include information about establishments’ physical 
capital. 
ESK γγ ≤
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The general implication of the model is that under very reasonable assumptions quality 
competition implies that more skilled and educated workers are sorted into more efficient 
firms. The reason is that in equilibrium more efficient firms choose to produce higher quality 
goods. Since more efficient firms also tend to have larger size and sell in more distant markets 
in equilibrium, we should observe that: first, average education of employees tends to be 
higher in larger firms and firms selling in more distant markets; and second, firms with higher 
average education, larger size and selling in more distant markets tend to pay higher average 
wages to every education group. We empirically test these hypotheses in the following 
sections.13
 
An important final question is which pattern, if any, do firm-characteristics wage premia 
have with respect to worker’s education. This amounts to ascertaining the sign of 
. As can it be observed in expression (17) below, that this sign depends on 
most parameters of the model, as well as on the distribution of skills in every education group, 
and the differences in wages, on which we can only make conjectures. Yet, the sign will tend 
to be positive the larger are the differences in productivity and wages within educated workers 
(between skilled and unskilled educated workers) with respect to the difference within non-
educated workers (i.e., the larger the difference 
j
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Furthermore, the model predicts that firm-characteristics wage premia should all change in the 
same direction as we compare them for different education groups. The reason is that given 
any sign for , the sign of the relationship between Aj
N
j
E
j dAwwd /)/( j and any of the firm 
                                                 
13 In our simple model, the only difference across firms is in the linear efficiency parameter. Note that this 
implies that firm characteristics would be perfectly correlated although in a non-linear way. Additional 
differences in the production function across industries and firms, idiosyncratic demand shocks, etc, may 
however destroy this non-linear correlation between characteristics. 
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characteristics (size, remoteness and average education) is always positive. In the empirical 
part of the paper we assess and compare the firm-characteristics wage premia for every 
education group. 
 
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
In the rest of the paper we test some implications of the model. The source of our data is the 
Spanish Encuesta de Estructura Salarial for 2002 (Wage Structure Survey, EES-2002) 
elaborated by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). This survey is conducted by the 
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) following a two-stage stratified sampling 
methodology. In the first stage, establishments with at least ten workers are stratified by 
economic activity, firm size and region. Agriculture and the public sector are excluded. In the 
second stage, workers at every establishment are randomly selected. The survey contains 
matched employer-employee data for more than 15,000 employers and 150,000 employees. 
The main limitation of the survey is that it does not keep track of the same employers and 
employees for different years, so that we are able to perform only a cross-section analysis. 
 
The survey provides information about the region where the establishment is located, 
industry, size (groups; i.e., discrete variable), collective bargaining if any, and market 
orientation (the main broad market for establishments’ output; it distinguishes between local, 
national, European Union and Rest of the World markets). We exclude from the sample firms 
in industries that do not have any exporting establishment (building, production and 
distribution of electrical energy, gas and water, education, health, social work and other social 
activities, and personal service activities). This leaves us with a sample of 11,567 
establishments from 36 three-digit industries (main subsections of the National Classification 
of Economic Activities) for our analysis on average education in establishments. 
 
The survey then provides information on the individual characteristics of workers 
randomly selected at every establishment, such as education, sex, age, years working in the 
current establishment, type of contract, full/part-time job, etc. In our analysis on wages, we 
further restrict the sample to male workers with full-time jobs and indefinite contracts.14 We 
also exclude workers who went through transitory labor incapacity or were included in job 
promotion programs. In this way, we isolate the establishment-characteristics effect on wages 
from other circumstances such as gender discrimination, positive discrimination policies, 
                                                 
14 Spanish legislation distinguishes between temporary (or “fixed term”) contracts and indefinite (regular) 
contracts. Temporary contracts were introduced to promote employment. They can be readily terminated once the 
contract is over, and are mainly used to hire young workers in their first employment. 
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underemployment, etc. All this depuration brings about a sample of 35,602 workers and 9,120 
establishments. 
 
Table 1 reports the main descriptive statistics on establishments’ characteristics according 
to the EES-2002. Establishments whose main market is the EU or the rest of the world only 
add up to about 6.5-percent of the total. Most firms have less than 50 workers (71.3-percent) 
and only 11-percent employ 200 or more workers. Although the percentage of workers with a 
college degree is 10.5, only 27.6-percent of the establishments in the sample include at least 
one worker with a college degree among their surveyed employees. The percentage of workers 
with a college degree in this last subset of establishments is 34.2. This suggests that the data 
on the fraction of college graduates should be treated as censored data. 
 
The relationship between establishment size and market orientation shows a very strong 
pattern: the fraction of establishments with the smallest size is monotonically decreasing in 
market remoteness. The opposite occurs with the other two size groups. Establishments selling 
most of their production in non-local markets employ more educated labor and a larger 
fraction of workers with a college degree. In particular, the fraction of college graduates in 
firms exporting most of their output to countries outside the EU is almost three times higher 
than in firms selling in local markets. It may be surprising, however, the low average 
education and the low fraction of educated workers in establishments exporting most of their 
production to the EU market, compared to establishments oriented to the national market. This 
may be due to a Spanish specialization within the EU in rather low-skilled industries, which in 
turn would be the consequence of having a relatively low endowment of college graduates 
within the EU (before the enlargement from 15 to 25 members in 2004). The econometric 
analysis in the next Section lends support to this hypothesis by showing that once we control 
for two-digit industries the average education as well as the fraction of college-educated 
workers in establishments selling most output to the EU is larger than in national-market 
establishments. 
 
Finally, establishments selling in more-distant markets tend to pay higher wages. For 
example, establishments selling most of their output in international markets other than the EU 
pay wages 66.5-percent higher than those paid by establishments selling in local markets. 
Again, there is some exception, however, since establishments oriented to the national market 
pay the same average wage than those oriented to the EU market. Clearly, the higher average 
education in national-market oriented establishments may be the reason. The econometric 
analysis of Section 5 brings about substantially different results in this respect. 
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4. ESTABLISHMENT  CHARACTERISTICS AND EMPLOYEES’ EDUCATION 
 
In this Section we test empirically whether larger establishments and establishments selling in 
more remote markets do in fact employ workers with higher average education or having a 
college degree in larger proportion. We use weighted least squares to estimate the following 
equation, where the left-hand-side variable  is the mean years of schooling of establishment 
j’s employees (or, alternatively, the fraction of college-educated employees), and where the 
covariates of interest are dummies for establishments’ size and establishments’ market 
orientation (defined as the main destination of output): 
je
 
(18)  ;32 6543210 jjWjEjNjjjj vZMMMSSe +++++++= ααααααα
 
In this equation, S2 is a dummy for firms employing between 50 and 199 workers, and S3 for 
firms employing more than 199 workers. The dummies for market orientation are MN for 
establishments selling most of their output in the national market, ME for the European Union 
market, and MW for rest of the world (i.e., non-EU countries). The reference group for 
estimation is establishments with a number of employees between 10 and 49, and selling most 
of their output in the local market. Zj is a vector of other controls that includes dummies for 
establishment location (17 regions) and also dummies for establishment industry when noted 
(36 industries).  is the error term.  jv
 
Results are reported in Table 2. The left-hand-side variable for the results in columns (1)-
(3) is the average years schooling of the establishment’s employees. Column (1) shows that all 
variables are positive and statistically significant at 1-percent, except ME. Since the type of 
good being produced is likely to be an important determinant of the demand for human capital 
and the optimal size of the establishment, we include dummies that control for industry in the 
specification in column (2). Industry dummies tend to increase the size and significance of the 
coefficients on market orientation. All the dummies for market orientation are now positive, 
very significant, quantitatively very important, and (statically) monotonically increasing in 
market distance, as predicted by the theoretical model. In particular, average education in 
establishments selling most of their production in the national or in the EU markets is about 
one year higher than in local-market establishments; and it is 2.1 years higher in 
establishments exporting most of its production to countries outside the EU (average schooling 
in the whole sample is 8.9: Table 1). The differences between local-market and national-
market establishments had not been explored in the literature. As observed in the Introduction, 
the result that national and European market orientation effects are similar, and that the 
difference between local and national-market establishments is as important as the difference 
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between national and World-market establishments is important, as it suggests that the main 
reason for the skill upgrading is not the exporting status. According to our analytical model, 
the reason is a common cause for both the establishment’s decisions on employees’ education 
and exporting status, which is efficiency. The difference in efficiency needed for a firm to 
move on from the local market to the national market may be higher than the difference 
needed to go on exporting. Therefore, the difference in labor composition between local and 
national-oriented establishments may also be more prominent. 
 
Furthermore, the two dummies for establishment size become negative though not 
statistically significant in column (2). Thus, not controlling for establishment’s industry may 
bring about misleading results on the effects of market orientation and size. The non-
significant results on the size effects suggest that there may be other reasons different from 
higher efficiency that also give rise to a larger establishment size (e.g., past efficiency; which 
may bring about a current large size if size is more persistent than efficiency, due to sunk 
investments, importance of self-financing, demand inertia, etc.). Large firms for reasons 
unrelated to efficiency would fail to employ higher average education workers, but should also 
fail to be oriented to non-local markets. In other words, size may still be a signal of efficiency 
(and therefore bring about higher average education in the establishment) for establishments 
oriented to the national o international markets. We test this hypothesis in column 3 where we 
interact size with market orientation. Since the number of firms with sizes S2 and S3 that sell 
only in local markets is too small (see Table 1) we include all of them together in one single 
group. Results are reported in column 3. The coefficients for large sizes conditional on selling 
most of their production in national or international markets, are now positive and significant. 
Large national and international establishments employ workers with average schooling about 
0.7 years higher than small national and international establishments (the coefficient for non-
local establishments of size S2 is somewhat larger than for the one for size S3, but the 
difference is not statistically significant). Note that the coefficients for market orientation not 
conditional on size, experience only a minor reduction. In contrast, there is now a significant 
negative coefficient for large establishments selling mostly in the reference market (the local 
one). Therefore, larger establishment size per se does not imply more demand for educated 
workers, but only when combined with other characteristics signaling high efficiency, such as 
national and international market orientation.  
 
In columns (4) to (6) of Table 2 we check for the robustness of our results using now the 
fraction of college-educated employees in the establishment as the left-hand-side variable. 
Since about 70-percent of the establishments in the sample do not include interviews to 
college-educated workers, least squares estimates may be inconsistent due to censured data 
problems. We therefore estimate a Tobit model by maximum likelihood. The qualitative 
 16
results are very similar to those already reported.15 Size effects become insignificant when 
including industry dummies in column (5), and turn out positive and significant again in 
column (6) when they are conditional on national and international market orientation. The 
most appreciable differences are that the coefficients on market orientation are now strictly 
increasing in distance as long as industry dummies are included in the equation, and that the 
negative coefficient for large establishments in the reference (the local) market is now not 
significant at 5-percent but only at 10-percent level.  
 
 
5. ESTABLISHMENT  CHARACTERISTICS AND WAGES 
 
We now test our model’s implications on wages. The wage equation is based on the usual 
Mincerian equation where the log of the employee’s hourly wage is a function of his 
education and potential experience. Accordingly, we include worker’s schooling years (Y), and 
potential experience (PE) which is defined as the difference between employee’s age and the 
expected age to complete his studies according to their official length. We also include tenure 
(T) which is defined as the number of years the individual has been working for its current 
employer. We then include establishment characteristics already used in the previous section: 
two dummies for firms’ size (S2 and S3), three dummies for market orientation (MN, ME and 
MW) and a vector Zj of other controls for establishment characteristics (35 dummies for three-
digit industries, and 16 dummies for regions). Additionally, we also include co-workers’ 
average years of schooling (e).16 Thus the wage equation is: 
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where wij is worker i’s hourly wage in establishment j, and uij is the residual. We also estimate 
an equation with establishment fixed effects jπ , 
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which are then regressed on firm characteristics (see equation (21) below). We use the sub-
sample of men with full-time job and indefinite contracts, as described in Section 3. The initial 
                                                 
15 Recall that the coefficients from a Tobit models do not reflect the marginal effects of the right-hand-side 
variables and therefore are not comparable with the LS estimates. 
16 We also considered average potential experience of co-workers as a further right-hand-side establishment 
characteristic, but always found it to be not statistically significant. 
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advantage of our study over previous ones is that we use directly observed matched data on 
individuals’ wages and characteristics and on establishments’ characteristics. 
 
5.1. Main Results 
 
Results are reported in Table 3. In columns (1)-(4) we estimate equation (19) using 
weighted least squares and adding successively different establishment characteristics. In the 
specification in column (1) we only include workers’ characteristics (schooling, potential 
experience, and tenure) and 16 dummies for regions that control for geographical differences 
some factors such as unemployment, composition of labor supply, and price level. In column 
(2) we add establishment size dummies. In column (3) we add co-workers average schooling, 
and market orientation. In our preferred specification in column (4) we also include 35 
dummies for industries. 
 
All the variables suggested by our theoretical model have the expected signs, are jointly 
statistically significant at the 1-percent level, and have an important quantitative impact on 
wages.17 According to estimation (4), workers in establishments whose main market is the 
whole country obtain average wages 10.5-percent higher than wages in local-market 
establishments. This wage premium rises to 18.1-percent and to 20.3-percent, respectively, 
when the main market is either the EU or the rest of the world (non-EU countries). As with the 
analysis on establishments’ labor composition in the previous section, the difference between 
local and national-market establishment effects is at least as important as the difference 
between national and international-market establishment effects which so far had been the 
only one analyzed by the literature. Co-workers education also has an important quantitative 
impact. Increasing co-workers education by one standard deviation brings about a wage 
increase of 6.9-percent; and moving from an establishment in the 10-th percentile of the 
establishments’ distribution across employees’ mean education (5 schooling years), to an 
establishment in the 90-th percentile (13.2 schooling years), increases worker’s wage by 20.8-
percent. The size wage premia are 12.1-percent and 15.6-percent for size-S2 and size-S3, 
respectively. Comparing the effects implied by coefficients in column (2) with those in 
column (4), we observe that the estimated wage premium for size-S2 establishments falls by 
30.4-percent, whereas the premium for size-S3 drops by 45.6-percent. These large reductions 
make clear the importance of a joint estimation of all establishment-characteristics effects. 
Overall, the large quantitative wage effect of these establishment characteristics suggests, 
according to our model, that unmeasured skills have a considerable productive importance. 
                                                 
17 Including establishment characteristics in the wage equation also gives raise to an important increase in 
explanatory power. Adjusted R2 rises by 21.4-percent in column (4) with respect to column (1). Note that 
specification in column 1 already includes 16 regional dummies. 
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Including all of our establishment characteristics also reduces the coefficient on worker’s 
years of schooling by more than one third, which is consistent with the common presumption 
that education coefficients partially capture the effect of unmeasured skills. Working in 
establishments with the good characteristics (those that our model associates with high skill 
sorting) brings about a wage premium that may be as important as a high-education premium. 
For example, according to our estimates in column (4), working in a medium size (S2) 
establishment whose main market is the national market brings about the same wage premium 
(23.9-percent) over the reference group (small local establishments) than 5.2 additional years 
of schooling.  
 
In column (5) of Table 3 we report the estimates of the establishment fixed effects model 
of equation (20). To carry out this estimation we remove from the sample establishments 
where only one employee was surveyed, so that we have at least two observations to estimate 
each establishment fixed effect. Thus, the sample is now reduced to 33,646 workers and 7,164 
establishments. It is of no surprise that this specification brings about the best fit as measured 
by the adjusted R2. Fixed effects are of little help in understanding the causes of wage 
differences, however. Notwithstanding, we can now regress the estimated fixed effects jπˆ  
from equation (20) on the observable establishment characteristics.18 In this way we can assess 
how much of establishment fixed effects can be explained by the observable establishment 
characteristics, and check for the robustness of our previous estimates of their effects. Hence 
we estimate the following equation: 
 
(21) .''''''3'2'ˆ 1098765 jjWjEjNjjjjj ZMMMeSS ηθββββββπ +++++++=  
 
Table 4 reports the results from this equation. Taking the results for the most 
comprehensive specification (column 3) as the reference, observable establishment 
characteristics explain 30-percent of the variation in the estimated establishment fixed effects. 
All coefficients are statistically very significant and their values are very similar to the 
corresponding models in Table 3. 
 
 
5.2. Robustness 
 
                                                 
18 This two-step procedure to assess the impact of establishment characteristics is similar to that followed by 
Abowd et al. (1999). 
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We now estimate the models in equations (19) and (20)-(21) using dummies for broad 
categories of education (HS for completed secondary studies, and U for a college degree) 
instead of years of schooling to control for employee’s education. We also use the fraction of 
co-workers with a college degree (e2) instead of co-workers’ average years of schooling. 
Results are qualitatively very similar and are reported in Table 5 (specification in each column 
corresponds, respectively, to the same column in Table 3). Again, they show that being 
employed by a good-characteristics establishment may be as important for worker’s income 
as formal education. For example, according to the results in column (4) of Table 5, a college 
degree implies a 31.1-percent wage premium over completed high school. This premium is 
somewhat lower than the one obtained by an employee of a medium size (S2) national-market 
establishment with a fraction of college-degree employees that is one standard deviation above 
average (using as reference the wage of an worker with the same individual observable 
characteristics working in a small local-market establishment with average fraction of college-
degree co-workers). 
 
There have been suggested some alternative explanations for the establishment-size wage 
premium. In Table 6 we include additional controls and interactions that help controlling for 
some of the alternatives. In column (1) we add a dummy for firm-level contracting (which is 
the way strong bargaining power workers and unions in large market power establishments 
may increase wages). Firm-level contracting is highly significant. It increases average wages 
by 7.6-percent and its inclusion reduces the coefficient on the S3-size premium in 2.5 
percentage points.19 Yet, all coefficients remain significant and quantitatively high (in fact, the 
coefficients for market orientation tend to be now somewhat larger). 
 
Second, internal labor markets have also been suggested as a potential source of higher 
average wages in larger firms. Large firms may provide better opportunities for internal 
promotion and more in the job training which then needs to be rewarded to reduce turnover; 
hence average wages should be larger for the same level of formal education. Notice however 
that these benefits would not be obtained by the employee from the outset, but only as time 
goes by working for the same firm. Therefore, this effect should show up as a larger payoff of 
tenure in larger firms. We test this hypothesis in column (2) by including interaction terms of 
tenure with S2 and S3. Only the interaction with the largest size turns out positive and 
statistically significant. Tenure in S3 establishments is about 20-percent more profitable than 
in small establishments. Inclusion of this interaction term reduces the S3-size premium by 3.1 
                                                 
19 This estimate is very consistent with the results in the analysis on firm-level contracting by Card and De la 
Rica (2006). They point out that firm-level contracting is more likely to occur where there is (or was) a strong 
union presence. 
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percentage points (thereby eliminating the previous small difference between the S2-size and 
the S3-size coefficients), and leaves almost unaltered the rest of coefficients. 
 
In column (3) we simultaneously include both the additional control and the interactions 
terms. The sign and size of the coefficients are similar to those in the previous columns, 
though only the coefficient for firm-level contracting retains statistical significance. The 
simultaneous inclusion of all these controls has only a minimal impact on the estimates for 
market orientation and co-workers education we have been analyzing. It reduces the estimated 
premium for S3-size establishments by more than six percentage points however. 
 
 
5.3. Establishment Characteristics and Wages by Education Groups  
 
Do establishment-characteristics wage effects show any pattern with respect to worker’s 
education? This an important question not only because it helps understanding the wage 
structure, but because –according to our model- it also provides indications about whether 
unmeasured skills are more important for high-education or for low-education workers when it 
comes at producing quality output. According to our model, the possible patterns depend –
among other parameters- on the relative importance of skills for producing quality (when 
comparing productivity of educated and non-educated workers). Our theoretical also predicts 
that regardless of whether establishment-characteristics wage premia are increasing or 
decreasing in worker’s education, all establishment-characteristics wage effects should show 
the same pattern. We now investigate this issue by estimating equation (19) for each major 
education group. We include in the equation the additional firm-level contracting variable and 
the interaction size-tenure terms from the last subsection since they already proved their 
potential relevance. 
 
We divide the sample into three sub-samples: workers without completed secondary 
education, workers with completed secondary education, and workers with a college degree. 
Results are shown in Table 7. All the coefficients for the three establishment characteristics 
we are analyzing have the expected positive signs and are significant at the 1-percent level in 
all sub-samples and equations. Whenever the difference is statistically significant, the 
coefficient for the S3-size is higher than the one for S2-size and the coefficients for market 
orientation are increasing in the remoteness of the market.  
 
The differences in the estimated coefficients across education groups are sizable and 
follow a systematic pattern. All our establishment-characteristics wage premia either are 
increasing in the level of education or the difference in coefficients is not statistically 
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significant (this occurs in the comparison of the S3 and the MN coefficients between the 
secondary and the university samples). For example, the coefficients on co-workers’ average 
education and market orientation for college graduates double or even triple those for primary-
education workers.20 To give a sense of the importance of establishment premia for wages of 
individuals with different education, we may consider the establishment premium for an 
individual working in a S2-size establishment exporting most of its production to the EU and 
with employees’ average education in the 75th percentile of the corresponding distribution 
(the reference would be the wage of an individual working in a small local-market 
establishment that is situated in the 25th percentile of the average-education characteristic). 
An individual in an establishment with those characteristics obtains a wage premium of 29.8-
percent if he has not completed secondary education, and a premium of 86.4-percent if he has 
a college degree. According to our model, these results tend to suggest that unmeasured skills 
of high-education workers are more productive (and therefore more valuable) than those of 
low-education workers. 
 
Finally, the results on experience and tenure warrant some comments. The wage impact of 
potential experience is sharply increasing in education. However, the impact of tenure (as 
measured by its general coefficient) is not. This pattern is reinforced by the results on the 
interactions between tenure and establishment size. Large firms are likely to offer better 
opportunities for internal promotion, learning, and on-the-job training that would tend to 
increase wages over time. Nevertheless, this effect only emerges as positive and significant in 
the case of least educated workers. For higher education individuals, the coefficients turn out 
negative and sometimes significant. Note that this does not mean that tenure has a negative 
impact on some wages since the sum of any of these interaction terms and the general 
coefficient for tenure, is always positive. These results suggest that in medium and large size 
                                                 
20 As observed in the Introduction, there are very few works investigating the pattern followed by establishment-
characteristics wage premia with respect to individuals’ education. Following a different methodology (i.e., using 
interaction terms between individual’s education and co-workers’ average education, instead of dividing the 
sample by education groups), Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2003) obtain that the establishment average-education 
wage premium is decreasing in worker’s own education in the UK, though they recognize that this runs counter 
to their theoretical prediction. Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx (2005) analyze the size wage premium and 
conclude that it is generally larger for blue-collar workers. To the extent that the blue-collard versus white-collard 
comparison can be related to our education-groups comparison, our results also point in the opposite direction. 
Firm-level contracting and the highly significant revenues to tenure that low-education workers enjoy in large 
firm seem responsible for a large share of the wage premium that low-education workers obtain in large firms. 
Additional results not included in the table show that these factors can be responsible for the difference in results 
(i.e., when not controlling for these effects, workers with the lowest education obtain the largest firm-size 
premium). Finally, our results for the market orientation premium tend to contradict those of Schank et al. (2006) 
who obtain that the premium for white-collard workers is statistically and quantitatively almost insignificant, and 
lower than for blue-collard workers. However, this result is not obtained using direct data but relies on imputed 
data on white-collard wages. Moreover, it is also in contradiction with Bernard and Wagner’s (1997) evidence 
that white-collard workers are the group responsible for almost all the exporting premium. 
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firms, internal promotion may be more important in low-education levels than in high levels, 
and that these firms may attribute a high value to experience in other firms (on average, a 
value only slightly lower than to the experience within the firm).  
 
 
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
We have analytically studied the implications of establishments’ efficiency heterogeneity 
for the sorting of workers with different measured and unmeasured characteristics into 
establishments with different observable characteristics. Our theoretical model shows that 
more efficient firms tend to produce higher quality goods, employ a larger fraction of skilled 
and more-educated workers, have larger size, and sell in more distant markets. Therefore, 
since skills other than education are unmeasured in most empirical analysis, firms with the 
cited characteristics will be observed to pay higher average wages to workers with the same 
education level. Thus, the model is able to provide a simple integrated explanation for some 
observed correlations between establishment characteristics and wages within a competitive 
framework. It also points out to some additional testable implications about establishment 
demand composition and the pattern of establishment wage premia with respect to worker 
education. 
 
Our empirical results are favorable to all the implications of the model and extend the 
available empirical evidence in several directions. We estimate the joint effects of a notable set 
of establishment characteristics, using direct employer-employee matched observations and 
controlling for the usual individual characteristics. Market orientation has a significant and 
quantitatively important positive effect on the demand for human capital that is increasing in 
market remoteness. Moreover, in non-locally oriented establishments, establishment-size also 
implies higher average employees’ education. Size, main-market remoteness, average 
employees’ education, and firm-level contracting also have a significant positive and 
quantitatively important effect on wages. Yet, the importance of market orientation does not 
only appear on the difference between exporting and non-exporting firms, as suggested so far 
by the literature. We showed that the differences in labor composition and in wages between 
national-market establishments and local establishments are at least as wide as the differences 
between export-oriented establishments and national-market-oriented establishments. The 
establishment characteristics we include in the wage equation reduce the estimated education 
wage premium by more than one third, thereby adding evidence in favor of the usual 
conjecture that, to a possible large extent, the estimated coefficients on education are capturing 
the productive value of other unmeasured skills. 
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All the establishment characteristics we analyzed are important for the wages of all 
workers whatever their education level. However, they are not equally important. 
Establishment-characteristics effects are increasing (though sometimes not strictly) in 
workers’ education. For example, the coefficients on co-workers’ average education and 
market orientation for college graduates double or even triple those for workers with only 
primary education. The sum of all the establishment wage premia may be as important for a 
college graduate as the education premium. Following the interpretation suggested by our 
theoretical model, unmeasured skills seem much more valuable for high-education workers 
than for the less educated. 
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Table 1: Establishment Characteristics: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes: Data source is the EES-2002 using the sample weights provided by the survey. Establishments’ size, mean years of schooling, 
and the fraction of workers with a college degree are calculated for the sub-sample of 11567 establishments in industries that have at 
least one exporting firm. The fraction of employees with a college degree and average education are first obtained for each 
establishment and then averaged across establishments. Average wages are calculated using the sub-sample of 35602 men with full-
time jobs and indefinite contracts who did not go trough transitory labor incapacity nor were they included in job promotion programs. 
See Section 3 for other details on the sample. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
Distribution of Establishments: Main Market 
 
All Local National Interna- tional:EU 
Internat.:
Non-EU 
Mean years 
of 
schooling 
Fraction of  
employees 
with 
college 
degree 
Average 
wage  
(€ per hour) 
All 1 0.478 0.456 0.041 0.024 8.883   (2.920) 
0.105 
(0.20) 
 9.57 
(6.60) 
 10-49 
workers 0.713 0.406 0.279 0.021 0.007 
8.596 
(2.847) 
0.085 
(0.195) 
7.499 
(5.049) 
50-199 
workers 0.173 0.050 0.104 0.010 0.007 
9.251 
(2.964) 
0.134 
(0.223) 
9.875 
(6.474) 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 E
st
ab
lis
hm
en
ts
: 
Si
ze
 
 >199 
workers 0.114 0.022 0.072 0.010 0.009 
10.119 
(2.924) 
0.188 
(0.244) 
12.375 
(7.553) 
Mean years of 
schooling 
8.883   
(2.920) 
8.204  
(2.630) 
9.584   
(3.083) 
8.315   
(2.271) 
10.014   
(2.734)  
  
Fraction of  
employees with 
college degree 
0.105 
(0.20) 
0.058 
(0.16) 
0.155 
(0.25) 
0.063 
(0.12) 
0.171 
(0.24)  
  
Average wage  
(€ per hour) 
9.57 
(6.60) 
7.25 
(4.68) 
10.63 
(7.29) 
10.53 
(4.67) 
12.07 
(7.97)  
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 Table 2: Establishment Characteristics and Employees’ Education 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
S2 0.288**  (0.104) 
-0.002  
(0.102)  
0.110**  
(0.015) 
0.040**  
(0.013)  
S3 0.844**  (0.136) 
-0.141  
(0.139)  
0.223**  
(0.017) 
0.005   
(0.016)  
S2+S3   -0.507**   (0.159)   
-0.038*   
(0.020) 
MN
1.128**  
(0.090) 
1.094**  
(0.094) 
0.937**   
(0.106) 
0.179**  
(0.013) 
0.202**   
(0.012) 
0.176**  
(0.013) 
ME
0.043  
(0.147) 
0.999**  
(0.146) 
0.823**   
(0.154) 
0.073**  
(0.030) 
0.322**   
(0.028) 
0.294**  
(0.029) 
MW
1.546**  
(0.195) 
2.106**  
(0.180) 
1.877**   
(0.192) 
0.236**  
(0.034) 
0.462**  
(0.031) 
0.429**  
(0.032) 
(MN+ME+MW)×S2   0.727**   (0.193)   
0.106** 
(0.025) 
(MN+ME+MW)×S3   0.614** (0.207)   
0.071** 
(0.026) 
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.266 0.268    
Pseudo R2    0.126 0.300 0.301 
Observations 11567 11567 11567 11567 11567 11567 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Notes: In columns (1) to (3) the left-hand-side variable is average schooling years of the employees in the 
establishment. The estimation method is Weighted Least Squares using the sample weights provided by the survey. 
In columns (4) to (6) the left-hand-side variable is the fraction of college-educated employees in the establishment, 
and the estimation method is Maximum likelihood using a Tobit model and the sample weights provided by the 
survey. A constant and dummies for 16 regions are always included. Dummies for 35 industries are included only 
when noted. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. See Section 3 for details on the data source and sample. ** 
means significant at 1 percent; and * at 10 percent. 
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Table 3: Establishment Characteristics and Wages 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employee 
Characteristics:  
    
Y 0.066**  (0.002) 
0.059**   
(0.002) 
0.042**  
(0.001) 
0.041**  
(0.001) 
0.042**  
(0.002) 
PE 0.026**  (0.002) 
0.026**   
(0.002) 
0.027**  
(0.002) 
0.025**  
(0.002 
0.026**  
(0.001) 
PE2/100 -0.033**  (0.004) 
-0.031**    
(0.003) 
-0.034**  
(0.003) 
-0.031**  
(0.003) 
-0.036**  
(0.003) 
Tenure  0.018**  (0.002) 
0.015**   
(0.002) 
0.014**  
(0.001) 
0.013**  
(0.001) 
0.014**  
(0.001) 
Tenure2/100 -0.020**  (0.005) 
-0.019**   
(0.004) 
-0.020**  
(0.004) 
-0.019**  
(0.004) 
-0.021**  
(0.004) 
Establishment 
Characteristics: 
   
  
S2 
 
0.160**   
(0.012) 
0.112**  
(0.013) 
0.114**  
(0.013)  
S3 
 
0.252**   
(0.019) 
0.179**  
(0.018) 
0.145**  
(0.017)  
e 
 
 0.030**  
(0.003) 
0.023**  
(0.003)  
MN
  0.096**  
(0.013) 
0.100**  
(0.013)  
ME
  0.162**  
(0.033) 
0.166**  
(0.022)  
MW
  0.170**  
(0.024) 
0.185**  
(0.026)  
Industry Dummies No No No Yes _  
Establishment Fixed 
Effects No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.392 0.432 0.455 0.476 0.724 
Notes: the left-hand-side variable is the log of the hourly wage. In columns (1)-(4) we estimate equation (22) using 
Weighted Least Squares and including different sets of establishments’ characteristics. In specification in column 
(1) we only include workers’ characteristics (years of schooling, Y, potential experience, PE and tenure), a constant 
and 16 dummies for regions. In column (2) we add dummies for establishment size. In column (3) we add dummies 
for establishment market orientation (MN, ME and MW), size (S2 and S3), and co-workers’ average schooling (e). In 
column (4) we also include 35 dummies for industries. In column (5) we estimate the fixed-effects model of 
equation (23). Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. They are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for the 
clustered sampling scheme. Data source is the EES 2002 using the sample weights provided by the survey. The 
number of observations is 35602 workers and 9120 establishments in columns (1)-(4) and 33646 workers and 7164 
establishments in column (5). See Section 3 for details on the data source and sample. ** means significant at 1 
percent; and * at 10 percent. 
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Table 4: Regressing the Estimated Establishment Fixed Effects 
with respect to the Observable Establishment Characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
S2 0.164**  (0.013) 
0.105**  
(0.013) 
0.104**  
(0.014) 
S3 0.264**  (0.022) 
0.175**  
(0.022) 
0.149**  
(0.024) 
e  0.027**  (0.002) 
0.019**  
(0.003) 
MN
 0.087**  
(0.014) 
0.095**  
(0.015) 
ME
 0.148**  
(0.025) 
0.173**  
(0.023) 
MW
 0.177**  
(0.024) 
0.194**  
(0.024) 
Industry 
Dummies No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.191 0.258 0.299 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is the establishment fixed effects estimated with 
equation (19) (they correspond to the results in column (4) of Table 3). The right-
hand-side variables are the following. In column (1) we only include dummies for 
the 16 regions and establishment size (S2 and S3). In column (2) we add co-
workers’ average schooling (e), and dummies for market orientation (MN, ME and 
MW). In column (3) we also include 35 industry dummies. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. They are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for the clustered 
sampling scheme. The number of establishments is 7164. See Section 3 for details 
on the data source and sample. ** means significant at 1 percent; and * at 10 
percent. 
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Table 5: Establishment Characteristics and Wages. Robustness Using Alternative 
Measures for Employee and Co-workers’ Education 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employee 
Characteristics:  
    
HS 0.289**  (0.011) 
0.258**  
(0.010) 
0.212**  
(0.011) 
0.193**  
(0.011) 
0.140**  
(0.009) 
U 0.732**  (0.020) 
0.666**  
(0.020) 
0.481**  
(0.016) 
0.464**  
(0.016) 
0.425**  
(0.016) 
PE 0.029**  (0.002) 
0.028**  
(0.002) 
0.029**  
(0.002) 
0.028**  
(0.002 
0.028**  
(0.001) 
PE2/100 -0.040**  (0.003) 
-0.040**  
(0.003) 
-0.004**  
(0.003) 
-0.038**  
(0.003) 
-0.040**  
(0.003) 
Tenure  0.019**  (0.002) 
0.015**  
(0.001) 
0.015**  
(0.002) 
0.014**  
(0.001) 
0.014**  
(0.001) 
Tenure2/100 -0.021**  (0.005) 
-0.021**  
(0.004) 
-0.022**  
(0.004) 
-0.021**  
(0.004) 
-0.021**  
(0.004) 
Establishment 
Characteristics: 
   
  
S2 
 
0.163** 
(0.012) 
0.115**  
(0.013) 
0.121**  
(0.013)  
S3 
 
0.256** 
(0.018) 
0.182**  
(0.017) 
0.162**  
(0.016)  
e2 
 
 0.413**  
(0.049) 
0.395**  
(0.045)  
MN
  0.086**  
(0.012) 
0.092**  
(0.013)  
ME
  0.161**  
(0.028) 
0.150**  
(0.021)  
MW
  0.164**  
(0.024) 
0.158**  
(0.024)  
Dummies for industry No No No Yes _ 
Establishment Fixed 
Effects No No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.404 0.446 0.474 0.496 0.724 
Notes: the left-hand-side variable is the log of the hourly wage. All columns correspond to the same models in Table 
3, except that we now use dummies for broad categories of education (HS corresponds to completed secondary 
studies, and U to a college degree) instead of years of schooling to control for employee’s education; and that we 
use the fraction of co-workers with a college degree (e2) instead of co-workers’ average years of schooling. See the 
notes in Table 3. ** means significant at 1 percent; and * at 10 percent. 
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Table 6: Establishment Characteristics and Wages. Robustness 
Including Additional Controls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Employee Characteristics:    
Y 0.041**  (0.001) 
0.041**  
(0.001) 
0.041** 
(0.001) 
PE 0.025**  (0.002) 
0.025**  
(0.002) 
0.025** 
(0.002) 
PE2/100 -0.031**  (0.003) 
-0.030**   
(0.003) 
-0.031** 
(0.003) 
Tenure  0.013**  (0.001) 
0.013**  
(0.001) 
0.013** 
(0.001) 
Tenure2/100 -0.019**  (0.004) 
-0.022**   
(0.004) 
-0.021** 
(0.004) 
Establishment Characteristics:    
S2 0.107**  (0.013) 
0.119**  
(0.017) 
0.115** 
(0.016) 
S3 0.120**  (0.019) 
0.114**  
(0.023) 
0.097** 
(0.017) 
e 0.023**  (0.003) 
0.022**  
(0.003) 
0.022** 
(0.003) 
MN
0.100**  
(0.013) 
0.099**  
(0.013) 
0.100** 
(0.013) 
ME
0.168**  
(0.022) 
0.164**  
(0.022) 
0.167** 
(0.022) 
MW
0.193**  
(0.026) 
0.187**  
(0.026) 
0.194** 
(0.026) 
Firm-level contracting 0.073**  (0.022)  
0.070** 
(0.022) 
Tenure×S2  -0.0003  (0.001) 
-0.0006 
(0.001) 
Tenure×S3  0.0024**  (0.001) 
0.0019 
(0.001) 
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.477 0.478 
Notes: the left-hand-side variable is the log of the hourly wage. All models include 
a constant, 35 dummies for industries and 16 dummies for regions. Estimation 
method is weighted least squares. Robust standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and for the clustered sampling scheme in parenthesis. The 
number of observations is 35602 workers and 9120 establishments. See Section 3 
for details on the data. ** means significant at 1 percent; and * at 10 percent. 
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Table 7: Establishment Characteristics and Wages by Education Group 
Notes. We use three different sub-samples of workers according to their education level: workers 
without completed secondary studies (primary), workers with completed secondary studies 
(Secondary), and workers with a college degree (University). The left-hand-side variable is the log of 
the hourly wage. Estimation method is Weighted Least Squares. All models include a constant, 35 
dummies for industries and 16 dummies for regions. Robust standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and for the clustered sampling scheme are in parenthesis. See Section 3 for details 
on the data source and sample. ** means significant at 1 percent; and * at 10 percent. 
 Primary Secondary University 
Employee Characteristics:    
PE 0.016** (0.001) 
0.027**  
(0.003) 
0.060**  
(0.005) 
PE2/100 -0.020** (0.003) 
-0.032**  
(0.007) 
-0.001**  
(0.013 
Tenure  
0.015** 
(0.015) 
0.016**  
(0.003) 
0.015**  
(0.006) 
Tenure2/100 
-0.024** 
(0.005) 
-0.026**  
(0.008) 
-0.037**  
(0.015) 
Establishment  Characteristics :    
S2 0.107** (0.017) 
0.147**  
(0.028) 
0.167**  
(0.048) 
S3 0.091** (0.025) 
0.159**  
(0.035) 
0.133**  
(0.049) 
E 0.016** (0.003) 
0.028**  
(0.004) 
0.041**  
(0.009) 
MN
0.052** 
(0.012) 
0.136** 
(0.022) 
0.128**  
(0.041) 
ME
0.095** 
(0.021) 
0.208**  
(0.038) 
0.305**  
(0.073) 
MW
0.097**  
(0.022) 
0.214**  
(0.038) 
0.275**  
(0.068) 
Firm-level contracting 
0.085** 
(0.024) 
0.055*  
(0.029)  
0.062  
(0.039) 
Tenure×S2 0.002* (0.001) 
-0.003*  
(0.002) 
-0.009**  
(0.004) 
Tenure×S3 0.005** (0.001) 
-0.002  
(0.002) 
-0.006  
(0.005) 
Number of  Establishments 7466 3966 1856 
Number of workers 21705 9594 4303 
Adjusted R2 0.443 0.399 0.332 
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